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Abstract
We examine whether by adding a credit channel to the standard New
Keynesian model we can account better for the behaviour of US macro-
economic data up to and including the banking crisis. We use the method
of indirect inference which evaluates statistically how far a models sim-
ulated behaviour mimics the behaviour of the data. We nd that the
model with credit dominates the standard model by a substantial margin.
Credit shocks are the main contributor to the variation in the output gap
during the crisis.
Key words: nancial frictions, credit channel, bank crisis, indirect
inference
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1 Introduction
The banking crisis that erupted in 2007 and triggered the Great Recession of
2009 has led many economists and policy-makers to question the standard New
Keynesian model of the economy on the grounds that it can neither account
for the crisis nor shed any light on banking behaviour since it has no banking
sector. In its defence it can be said that it has been shown to give a good
account of the US economys business cycle behaviour in recent years, including
the crisis period- Liu and Minford (2012); furthermore if shifts in the trend
of potential output are added to the model, it can give a good account of the
overall behaviour since the crisis, including the permanent e¤ects of such shifts
in trend - Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012). However, the absence of a banking
sector remains a serious gap since clearly banking shocks contributed to the
recent crisis in a material way. Accordingly, in this paper we explore how far
We are grateful to Huw Dixon and Paul de Grauwe for helpful comments; and also to an
anonymous referee for productive suggestions.
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adding a banking sector, based on recent work of De Fiore and Tristani (2012),
can improve the standard models t to the US data and also how this extended
model accounts for the recent behaviour of the US economy. Our approach,
which uses small aggregated DSGE models, parallels recent work on the US
that uses large-scale DSGE models with an added banking sector to account
for the crisis-Christiano, Motto & Rostagno (2010), Gilchrist et al. (2009) and
Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
To anticipate, we nd that the model with the banking extension improves
on the standard model substantially and also attributes the bulk of the output
recession to banking. This result, as we have already said, applies to the business
cycle part of the data- to give an overall account of the crisis one must also add
in the e¤ects of trend output shifts which we do not deal with here.
In the rest of this paper, we rst set out the standard and extended models; in
the third section we explain our testing procedures which are based on indirect
inference, whereby a model is judged by its ability in simulation to replicate
behaviour found in the data; in the fourth we set out our results for the usual
calibrated versions of these models; in the fth section we reestimate the models
to get them as close as possible to the data and test these reestimated versions.
In the sixth section we interpret the model results for the crisis episode and
compare them with other recent work on the crisis origins. The last section
concludes.
2 The Models
The standard New Keynesian model includes a standard aggregate demand
equation, an aggregate supply function, and a policy rule equation, as follows:
~Yt = Et ~Yt+1   a1(Rt   Ett+1) + "1t (1)
t = b1 ~Yt + Ett+1 + k"2t (2)
Rt = (1  c1)(c2t + c3 ~Yt) + c1Rt 1 + ut (3)
where ~Yt is the output gap, t is the rate of ination, Rt is the nominal
interest rate, and "1t, "2t, and ut are the demand error, supply error and policy
error respectively. These errors are assumed to be autoregressive processes
with the coe¢cients calculated from the sample estimates. Equation 1 is the
aggregate demand equation, determined by the expectation of output gap in the
next period and real interest rate. Equation 2 is the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve. Equation 3 is the Taylor Rule (1993) but with the lagged interest rate
added to allow for smoothing of interest rate reactions over time. This rational
expectations model is solved by Dynare (Juillard 2001).
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2.1 A Model with Credit: Adding a Banking Sector
We follow De Fiore and Tristani (2012) in their adaptation of this model to in-
clude a credit channel. They assume that rms producing homogeneous goods
for the wholesale market consist of risk-neutral entrepreneurs who produce with
inputs of labour and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. They have to pay work-
ers in advance of production by raising external nance from banks. It is as-
sumed that the nancial market is imperfect, with asymmetric information and
costly state verication (see Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985); there is
a risk of default on their debts because of their idiosyncratic shocks. Perfectly
competitive banks lend to them on debt contracts that are the optimal under
this set-up.
The timing of the economy is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
the nancial market opens with the aggregate shocks. Households then make
their portfolio decisions by allocating their wealth (including existing assets,
bond and deposits). The banks keep these deposits, which are used to nance
the production of rms. Each wholesale rm stipulates a contract with a bank
in order to pay their labour costs. In the second period, the goods market
opens. Wholesale rms produce homogeneous goods, which are then sold to
the retail sector. If prots are adequate to repay the debt, then the rms will
place the remaining revenues into the nancing of entrepreneurial consumption.
If the revenues are not su¢cient to repay the debt, then they will default and
their production is seized by the banks. Firms in the retail sector buy the
homogeneous goods from wholesale entrepreneurs in a competitive market and
they use them to produce di¤erentiated goods at no cost. Retail rms have
some market power due to the di¤erentiation of their goods. However, they are
not free to change their price because prices are subject to Calvo contracts. The
retail goods are then purchased both by households and wholesale entrepreneurs
for their own consumption.
Everything in this model is standard to the New Keynesian model apart
from the banking contract. In the wholesale sector, the rms (indexed by i) are
owned by entrepreneurs, who face a linear technology production function that
is specied as:
yi;t = At!i;tli;t (4)
where At is an aggregate productivity shock and !i;t is an idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock with log-normal distribution function  and density function
. This production function can be seen as an abstraction from capital accu-
mulation which forms the basis of the credit need in the Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) model. In De Fiore and Tristanis model, it is assumed that
each rm receives a constant endowment of internal funds  at the beginning
of each period; but these funds are insu¢cient to nance their desired level of
production so that they must borrow from the banks. These charge an interest
rate spread over the risk-free rate, reecting the resulting default risk.
Firms pay wages by raising external nance before proting from the sale of
retail goods. The nancial contract is stipulated with the banks before observing
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the idiosyncratic productivity shock but after observing aggregate shocks. The
amount of external nance is Pt(xi;t  ), which means that the total funds
at hand are Ptxi;t = Ptxt since all rms are identical. Since these wholesale
rms are perfectly competitive and operate under constant returns to scale,
they make zero prots in equilibrium and borrow the full amount of their wage
bill as dictated by aggregate demand.
The terms on which they can do this are dictated by the bank contract.
The banks, also perfectly competitive, will lend at a spread that gives them an
expected return equal to their cost of deposits, Rt. This must compensate for
the risk of default which rises with the size of the loan (=the wage bill) and
the risk-free rate. As the wage bill (i.e. the value of employment) rises, the
size of possible bankruptcy rises and with it the credit spread. As the risk-free
rate rises, the banks cost of funds rises and this is passed on to rms; because
this higher cost makes it harder for the rms to pay back the funds, default
probabilities rise. Unlike the credit contract of Bernanke et al. (1999), which is
for investment, the contract here is for working capital. ie for production itself.
Bank funding is therefore a cost of production that a¤ects ination.
The logic of the bank contract works as follows. The rm needs enough
funds to pay for its wage bill, ie its direct production costs, for producing the
goods required for equilibrium aggregate demand. Since it has limited funds,
the total funds it needs denes its required leverage. For the bank to supply
this leverage it requires, for a given prot rate of the rm, a certain bankruptcy
threshold, which rises with rising leverage; this threshold is given by the in-
centive compatibility constraint on the rm- namely that at this threshold it
must be just in the interest of the rm not to default, so that the loan service
it has to pay is just equal to its expected return on its assets. The combination
of this leverage and the threshold dene for this rate of prot what the bank
must charge as a risk-spread on top of the risk-free interest rate, so that it (as
a perfectly competitive bank) earns an expected return on its loans just equal
to the risk-free deposit rate it pays on its deposits.
The full derivation of the optimal contract is complex- see De Fiore and
Tristani (op. cit.). The key details are as follows: the threshold ! is given by
the equation for the banks zero prot conditions as g(!; ) [the banks expected
share of rm prots net of bankruptcy monitoring costs] = (x 
x
)R
q
where the
threshold rises with required funds, x, the risk-free rate, R, and it falls with the
prot rate the rm makes, q. The interest rate the rm will pay on its loan,
z, relative to its prot rate, q, is in turn given by z
q
= !( x
x 
), which can be
thought of as measuring the burden of funding costs on the rm. For the rm
to be willing to pay these costs the burden must be lowered su¢ciently by a rise
in the prot rate, which lowers !: The optimal contract is set where q is large
enough to optimise the rms expected prots after paying the funding costs-
as rms have free entry under perfect competition this will in the long run (ie
steady state) also be the zero net prot point where the rms costs including
funding just equal its revenues.
After successive substitutions to reduce it to a small compact form, the credit
model can be written in loglinearised form as:
4
~Yt = Et ~Yt+1 a1(Rt Ett+1) a2(^t Et^t+1)+a3(Rt EtRt+1)+ 1t (5)
t = b1 ~Yt + Rt + b2^t + Ett+1   2t (6)
^t = c1 ~Yt   c2Rt + c33t (7)
Rt = (1  d1)(d2t + d3 ~Yt) + d1Rt 1 + ut (8)
where each variable is linearised around its steady state. ^ denotes log-deviations
from steady states. ~Yt is the output gap, dened as output in deviation from
potential output; t is the rate of ination; Rt is the nominal interest rate; t
is the credit spread; 1t, 2t and 3t represent the demand, supply, and credit
market shocks, respectively, and ut the policy shock. It is assumed that the four
errors are AR(1) processes.
Equation 5 is the new version of the IS curve; it now also depends on the
credit spread and the nominal interest rate (the latter reecting entrepreneurial
prots which are correlated positively with the cost of nance). Equation 6 is
the extended Phillips Curve: here the nominal interest rate and credit spread
now enter as cost factors. Equation 7 is the reduced form for the credit spread.
This increases with aggregate demand as this raises the funds requirement. It
falls with the nominal interest rate because for a given funds requirement this
makes funds more expensive; given rms capacity to pay is set by aggregate
demand conditions, the spread has to fall for them to be able to a¤ord the
same amount of credit. Equation 8 is the policy rule that is used in this model,
unchanged from the standard model. The models coe¢cients from Equation 5
to 7are functions of the structural coe¢cients as in the Table 1.
Reduced form Coe¢cients Denitions
a1 = 
1+ 1 e
c
1 ' e
c
interest rate elasticity on output gap
a2 =
1 2
e
c
1 ' e
c
credit spread coe¢cients on output gap
a3 =
e
c
1 ' e
c
interest surprise coe¢cient on output gap
 = 0:99 discount factor
 = (1  )(1  )= coe¢cient of interest rate on ination
b1 = (
 1 + ') coe¢cient of output gap on ination
b2 = (
 11 + 2) coe¢cient of credit spread on ination
c1 =
1+'+ 1 Y
c
1
coe¢cient of output gap on spread
c2 =
 1 e
c
1
coe¢cient of interest rate on spread
c3 =
1
1
nancial market shock parameter
Table 1: Reduced Form Coe¢cients
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As this reveals there are 10 structural coe¢cients determining 12 model co-
e¢cients (excluding  which is xed); this enables us to test the model in terms
of the structural coe¢cients, which in turn determine the model coe¢cients
uniquely.
The model is written here in terms of the four shocks to the IS, Phillips
Curve, credit spread and interest rate rule. These are the familiar ones from
such reductions of New Keynesian models to a few equations; as is well-known
while the interest rate rule shock is structural, the result of central bank choice,
the other three are linear combinations of the structural shocks in the underlying
DSGE model and so reduced form shocks. Thus the IS shock is the demand
e¤ect of these structural shocks, while the PP shock is their supply e¤ect;
and in this model the credit spread shock is their e¤ect on the credit premium.
At the aggregated level of this model these shocks are the ones we observe
and accordingly the ones we use to evaluate the model empirically. They are
also comparable with shocks discussed in relation to other such New Keynesian
aggregated models and so we continue our account of the model in terms of them
at this stage. In the model here the underlying shocks are two: a technology
shock and a loan monitoring shock, which is a shock to banks lending costs;
once the model is tested and estimated, we can also calculate best estimates
of what these underlying shocks are; and then compute the way these have
a¤ected the economy. We do this below, once we have completed the testing
and estimation in terms of the observed data and errors. Thus for now we will
continue to refer to the observed errors when we refer to shocks.
To illustrate the workings of this model, we show the impulse response func-
tions (IRF) for the four shocks, using the estimated parameters from section
5 below. A nancial shock (3t), by directly raising the credit premium, also
raises costs and so ination; this in turn leads to a rise in the risk-free rate as
policy reacts. Output falls in response to this general tightening of monetary
conditions (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: IRF to a Financial Shock
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A monetary policy shock (ut) in Figure 2 raises the real interest rate sharply:
this in turn depresses output and ination, and lowers the credit premium as
lending drops with the lower wage bill. Though the real rate rises, the nominal
risk-free rate falls with the fall in ination.
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Figure 2: IRF to a Monetary Policy Shock
The demand shock (1t) illustrates the way that higher ination and output
cause a rise in interest rates and this in turn reduces the credit premium with
the reduction in rms capacity to pay the credit margin (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: IRF to a Demand Shock
Finally, in Figure 4, the supply shock (2t), raising productivity, lowers in-
ation and boosts output, so also the credit premium, but lowers interest rates
as money is loosened.
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Figure 4: IRF to a Supply Shock
3 The Testing Procedure
Indirect Inference provides a framework for judging whether a model with a
particular set of parameters could have generated the behaviour found in a set
of data. The procedure provides a statistical criterion for rejecting the model
as the data generating mechanism.
Indirect inference has been well known in the estimation literature, since
being introduced by Smith (1993); see also Gregory and Smith (1991, 1993),
Gourieroux et al. (1993), Gourieroux and Montfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
In indirect estimation the behaviour of the data is rst described by some atheo-
retical time-series model such as a Vector Auto Regression, the auxiliary model;
then the parameters of the structural model are chosen so that this model when
simulated generates estimates of the auxiliary model as close as possible to those
obtained from actual data. It chooses the structural parameters that can min-
imise the distance between some function of these two sets of estimates. In
what follows we give a brief account of the method; a full account, together
with Monte Carlo experiments checking its accuracy and power and comparing
it with other methods in use for evaluating DSGE models, can be found in Le,
Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (LMMW, 2011 and 2012).
The test is based on the comparison of the actual data with the data simu-
lated from the structural model through an auxiliary model. We choose a VAR
as our auxiliary model and base our tests on the VAR coe¢cients and also the
variances (of the variables in the VAR). The reason for choosing a VAR as the
auxiliary model is that a DSGE model like the ones here have as their solution a
restricted vector autoregressive-moving-average (VARMA), which can be closely
represented by a VAR. The VAR captures the dynamic inter-relationships found
in the data between the variables of the model. The test statistic is based on
the joint distribution of the chosen descriptors- here the VAR coe¢cients and
the variances. The null hypothesis is that the macroeconomic model is the data
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generating mechanism.
The test statistic for this joint distribution is a Wald statistic Following the
notation of Canova (2005), yt is dened as an m  1 vector of observed data
(t = 1; :::; T ) and xt() is an m1 vector of simulated data with S observations
from the model,  is a k1 vector of structural parameters from the model. We
set S = T , because we want to compare simulated data and actual data using
the same size of sample. yt and xt() are assumed to be stationary and ergodic.
The auxiliary model is f [yt; ], where  is the vector of descriptors. Under
the null hypothesis H0 :  = 0, the auxiliary model is then f [xt(0); (0)] =
f [yt; ]. The null hypothesis is tested through the q  1 vector of continuous
functions g(). Under the null hypothesis, g() = g((0)). aT is dened as
the estimator of  using actual data and S(0) as the estimator of based on
simulated data for 0. Then we have g(aT ) and g(S(0)):The simulated data
is obtained by bootstrapping N times of structural errors, so there are N sets
of simulated data. We can calculate the bootstrapped mean by
_________
g(S(0)) =
1
N
NP
k=1
gk(S(0)). The Wald statistic (WS) using the bootstrapped distribution
of g(aS) 
__________
g(S(0)) can be specied as
WS = (g(aT ) 
__________
g(S(0)) )
0W 1(0)(g(aT ) 
__________
g(S(0)) ) (9)
where W (0) is the variance-covariance matrix of the bootstrapped distribution
of g(aS) 
__________
g(S(0)) . Here we use a, the descriptors themselves, as g(a).
The testing procedure involves three steps. The rst step is to back out
the structural errors from the observed data and parameters of the model. If
the model equations have no future expectations, the structural errors can be
simply calculated using the actual data and structural parameters. If there
are expectations in the model equations, we calculate the rational expectation
terms using the robust instrumental variables methods of McCallum (1976) and
Wickens (1982); we use the lagged endogenous data as instruments and hence
use the auxiliary VAR model as the instrumental variables regression. The
errors are treated as autoregressive processes; their autoregressive coe¢cients
and innovations are estimated by OLS. 1
1The idea of using these backed-out errors is that they should be consistent with the model
and the data: otherwise the model being tested could be considered rejected by the data at
the structural stage. As noted by LMMW (2012), an alternative way to estimate the errors in
equations with rational expectations terms is to use the model (including the lagged errors)
to generate the expectations and iterate to convergence but in Monte Carlo experiments the
LIML method is slightly more accurate (if we knew the true model including the true 
s
, then
we could back out the exact errors by using the model to solve for the expectations; but of
course we do not).
Once the errors and their autoregressive coe¢cients () are estimated, they become part of
0 and are xed for the testing process therefore. In indirect estimation the search algorithm
nds the structural parameters, the backed-out errors and the s that jointly get closest to
the  found in the data: If they are also not rejected by these , then we may treat this model
as the data generating mechanism.
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Secondly, these innovations are then bootstrapped and the model is solved
by Dynare. The innovations are repeatedly drawn by time vector to preserve
any contemporaneous correlations between them. By this method we obtain
N (usually set at 1000) sets of simulated data, or bootstrap samples. These
represent the sampling variation of the data implied by the structural model.
Finally, we compute the Wald statistic. By estimating the VAR on each
bootstrap sample, the distribution of the VAR coe¢cients and data variances is
obtained, the . Thus, the estimates of  from the data and the model estimates
can be compared. We examine separately the models ability to encompass the
dynamics (the VAR coe¢cients) and the volatility (the variances) of the data.
We show where in the Wald bootstrap distribution the Wald based on the data
lies (the Wald percentile).
We use a VAR(1) as the auxiliary model. With a VAR(1),  contains 12
elements, the 9 VAR coe¢cients and the 3 data variances. This number of
descriptors provides a strong requirement for the structural model to match.
Raising the VAR order would increase the number of VAR coe¢cients (eg with
a VAR(2) the number would double to 18, making 21 elements in  in total); the
requirement of the test arguably becomes excessive, since we do not expect our
structural models to replicate data dynamics at such a high level of renement.
The steps above detail how a given model, with particular parameter values,
is tested. These values would typically be obtained in the rst place by cali-
bration. However, the power of the test is high and the model will be rejected
if the numerical values chosen for the parameters are inaccurate. Therefore, to
test a model fully one needs to examine its performance for all (theoretically
permissible) values of these parameters. This is where we introduce Indirect
Estimation; in this we search for the numerical parameter values that minimise
the Wald statistic. For this purpose we use a powerful algorithm due to Ingber
(1996) based on Simulated Annealing in which search takes place over a wide
range around the initial values, with optimising search accompanied by random
jumps around the space. After reestimating the model in this way, we then test
it on these values. If it is rejected on these, then the model itself is rejected, as
opposed merely to its calibrated parameter values.
4 Data, Calibration and Results for Calibrated
Models
4.1 Data
We apply the models to quarterly US data from 1981Q4 to 2010Q4 on the
output gap ( ~Yt), the ination rate (t), the interest rate (Rt) and the bank loan
rate (Rlt), collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data include
the recent nancial crisis as far availability permits.
The output gap ( ~Yt) is dened as the percentage gap between real GDP and
potential GDP, for which we use the HP lter. Ination (t) is dened as the
quarterly change in the log of the CPI. The interest rate is the federal funds
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rate, expressed as a fraction per quarter. t, Rt;and Rlt are linearly detrended,
because they have a signicant deterministic trend (see Table 2). The credit
spread is the di¤erence between the detrended bank prime loan rate (Rlt) and
risk free rate (Rt).
Table 22 gives the stationarity property for each variable, which conrms
that the ination and interest rate are trend-stationary. Figure 5 displays the
time paths of the four variables in the sample period after necessary detrending
has been made. It is notably volatile in the early 1980s, a turbulent period.
With ination in double digits, Paul Volcker was appointed as Fed chairman
in 1979 to bring it under control. With the resulting policies, which included
spells of both monetary base and credit controls, interest rate volatility reached
a peak, not exceeded even in the recent bank crisis. This usefully puts into a
longer term context the extent to which the banking shocks in the recent crisis
were not pathologically extreme.
Variable Coe¤ on the Trend P-Value Implication
~Y -9.97E-15 0.0000 stationary
 -5.61E-05** 0.0000 trend-stationary
R -0.000203** 0.0000 trend-stationary
Rl -0.000171** 0.0002 trend-stationary
^ 7.83E-20 0.0052 stationary
Table 2: ADF Test Results
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Figure 5: Time Paths of ~Y ; ;R; ^
2* represents 5% signicance level. ** denotes 1% signicance level.
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Our auxiliary model is the VAR(1), Equation 10,
2
4 ~Ytt
Rt
3
5 =
2
4 11 21 3112 22 32
13 23 33
3
5
2
4 ~Yt 1t 1
Rt 1
3
5+
t (10)
The VARs nine coe¢cients represent the dynamic properties found in the data.
We also look at the volatility properties as indicated by the variances. We
consider these two properties both separately and together, calculating Wald
statistics for each. We show these as the percentile where the data Wald lies in
the Wald bootstrap distribution.
4.2 Calibrating and Testing the Standard New Keynesian
Model
Table 3 shows the calibrated values for this model, taken from Minford and Ou
(2010).
Parameters Denitions Values
a1 real interest rate elasticity on output gap 0.50
b1 coe¢cient of output gap on ination 2.36
 ination expectation on ination 0.99
k coe¢cient of supply shock on ination 0.42
d1 Interest rate persistence parameter 0.8
d2 policy preference on ination 2.0
d3 policy preference on output gap 0.1
1 autoregressive coe¢cient for demand error 0.89
2 autoregressive coe¢cient for supply error 0.86
3 autoregressive coe¢cient for policy error 0.18
Table 3: Calibration of Standard Model
Table 4 shows the results for the standard model. The rst column lists the
parameters of the VAR (which represent the dynamic inter-relationships in the
data) in the upper part, the data variances (representing the volatility in the
data) in the second part and overall Wald percentiles for each aspect, dynamics,
volatility, and overall for both together in the third part. The second column
shows the values in the data, the third and fourth show the 95% bounds implied
by the DSGE model, the fth recording whether the data values are inside or
outside these bounds. What can be seen is that the standard model is on the
borderline of rejection for the dynamics, easily accepted on the volatility, and
accepted overall.
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Categories Actual 95% Lower 95% Upper IN/OUT
11 0.9145 0.7143 0.9197 IN
21 0.0205 -0.3961 0.0963 IN
31 -0.2214 -0.2133 0.3020 OUT
12 0.0554 -0.0748 0.0779 IN
22 0.1214 0.1187 0.4813 IN
32 0.1413 -0.0620 0.3252 IN
13 0.0336 -0.0249 0.0471 IN
23 -0.0073 -0.0221 0.1614 IN
33 0.8849 0.7916 0.9481 IN
var( ~Y ) 0.1584 0.0595 0.2265 IN
var() 0.0238 0.0150 0.0349 IN
var(R) 0.0183 0.0108 0.0443 IN
Wald (Dynamics) 95.6%
Wald (Volatility) 26.6%
Overall Wald 90.4%
Table 4: Test Results for Standard Model with Calibration
4.3 Calibrating and Testing the Credit Model
Table 5 lists the calibrated values in the credit model, as in De Fiore and Tristani
(2012). The rms idiosyncratic shock has a log-normal distribution with mean
and standard deviation calibrated so as to ensure the quarterly steady state
credit spread is equal to 0.5% and 1% bankruptcy rate for each quarter.
Table 6 shows for the credit model the equivalent test results shown above
for the standard model. It can be seen that the credit model is easily accepted
on the dynamics, not so easily accepted as the standard model on the volatility,
and somewhat more easily accepted overall. Thus, like the standard model, the
credit model is accepted by the data overall.3
It does however get closer to the data overall than the standard model. The
table 7 presents the comparison of the two models in terms of their p-values,
which measure the probability that each model gets as close as it does to the
data (in percent they are simply 100 minus the Wald percentiles). It can be
seen that except on volatility the credit model is closer than the standard model
to the behaviour of the data.
3Several of the VAR coe¢cients and one out of the three data variances lie outside their
individual 95% bounds, which might suggest that both on the dynamics and on the volatility
the model should be rejected. However, the joint distribution only coincides with the collected
individual distributions when the model-implied covariances are zero; this is generally not the
case with these models which imply substantial covariances between variables and also between
the VAR coe¢cients and the variable variances. Consider as an illustration the high positive
covariance between ination and interest rates induced by the Taylor Rule in these models;
this will also imply that for example the autocorrelations of these two variables will positively
covary- a sample in which ination is highly persistent will also be one in which interest rates
are highly persistent, whereas one in which ination is barely autocorrelated will also be one
in which interest rates mimic it closely, with low autocorrelation too.
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Parameters Denitions Values
 discount factor 0.99
a1 interest rate elasticity on output gap 1.54
a2 credit spread coe¢cients on output gap 3.82
a3 interest surprise coe¢cient on output gap 0.54
b1 coe¢cient of output gap on ination 1.49
 coe¢cient of interest rate on ination 1.49
b2 coe¢cient of credit spread on ination 9.45
c1 coe¢cient of output gap on spread 0.19
c2 coe¢cient of interest rate on spread 0.04
c3 nancial market shock parameter 0.075
d1 interest rate persistence parameter 0.8
d2 policy preference on ination 2.0
d3 policy preference on output gap 0.1
1 autoregressive coe¢cient for demand error 0.85
2 autoregressive coe¢cient for supply error 0.84
3 autoregressive coe¢cient for nancial error 0.86
4 autoregressive coe¢cient for policy error 0.18
Table 5: Calibration of Credit Model
Categories Actual 95% Lower 95% Upper IN/OUT
11 0.9145 0.7221 0.9134 OUT
21 0.0205 -0.3485 0.0076 OUT
31 -0.2214 -0.2152 0.3704 OUT
12 0.0554 -0.1444 0.0754 IN
22 0.1214 0.0032 0.3855 IN
32 0.1413 -0.3940 0.3138 IN
13 0.0336 -0.0354 0.0363 IN
23 -0.0073 -0.0273 0.0865 IN
33 0.8849 0.7384 0.9327 IN
var( ~Y ) 0.1584 0.0680 0.2602 IN
var() 0.0238 0.0245 0.0875 OUT
var(R) 0.0183 0.0085 0.0336 IN
Wald (Dynamics) 85.5%
Wald (Volatility) 79.0%
Overall Wald 83.4%
Table 6: Test Results for Credit Model with Calibration
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P-values (%) Credit Model Non-Credit Model
Dynamics 14.5 4.4
Volatility 21.0 73.4
Overall 16.6 9.6
Table 7: Comparison of Credit and Non-credit Model Using Calibration
5 Reestimating and Retesting the Models
5.1 Indirect Estimation of the Two Models
Tables 8 and 9 show the results of reestimation for each model. All parameters
are allowed to change (except for sign) apart from ; time preference, which is
held xed on theoretical grounds. For the standard model, the main changes
are that the Phillips Curve becomes steeper and the Taylor Rule stronger on in-
ation. For the credit model the real interest rate elasticity is much higher. The
Phillips Curve becomes steeper while again the Taylor Rule becomes stronger
on ination; but what is most striking is that all the credit coe¢cients need to
change substantially. In either model is there much change in the persistence
parameters whether in the Taylor Rule or on the errors.
Denitions Est. Cali. Change
a1 real interest rate elasticity on output gap 0.4307 0.50 -14%
b1 coe¢cient of output gap on ination 3.5046 2.36 49%
k coe¢cient of supply shock on ination 0.2935 0.42 -30%
d1 Interest rate persistence parameter 0.8190 0.8 2%
d2 policy preference on ination 2.8641 2.0 43%
d3 policy preference on output gap 0.0804 0.1 -20%
1 autoregressive coe¢cient for demand error 0.8849 0.89 -1%
2 autoregressive coe¢cient for supply error 0.8677 0.86 1%
3 autoregressive coe¢cient for policy error 0.1736 0.18 -4%
Table 8: Estimates of Standard Model
5.2 Testing the Reestimated Models
Tables 10 and 11 show the equivalent test results with reestimated parameters.
Both models get substantially closer to the data behaviour in all aspects, dy-
namics, volatility and overall; all individual VAR coe¢cients and data variances
lie within their model 95% bounds. Thus the data behaviour cannot now reject
either model either on dynamics or volatility or overall.
.
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Denitions Est. Cali. Change
a1 real interest rate elasticity on output gap 2.5151 1.54 63%
a2 credit spread coe¢cients on output gap 1.4988 3.82 -61%
a3 interest surprise coe¢cient on output gap 0.8879 0.54 64%
b1 coe¢cient of output gap on ination 2.2262 1.49 49%
 coe¢cient of interest rate on ination 1.5595 1.49 5%
b2 coe¢cient of credit spread on ination 6.8382 9.45 -28%
c1 coe¢cient of output gap on spread 0.7767 0.19 309%
c2 coe¢cient of interest rate on spread 0.1426 0.04 257%
c3 nancial market shock parameter 0.2612 0.075 248%
d1 interest rate persistence parameter 0.7553 0.8 -6%
d2 policy preference on ination 2.5316 2.0 27%
d3 policy preference on output gap 0.0192 0.1 -81%
1 autoregressive coe¢cient for demand error 0.8860 0.85 4%
2 autoregressive coe¢cient for supply error 0.8611 0.84 3%
3 autoregressive coe¢cient for nancial error 0.8693 0.86 1%
4 autoregressive coe¢cient for policy error 0.1557 0.18 -14%
Table 9: Estimates of Credit Model
Auxiliary model Actual 95% Lower 95% Upper IN/OUT
11 0.9145 0.7277 0.9316 IN
21 0.0205 -0.3817 0.1688 IN
31 -0.2214 -0.2566 0.3016 IN
12 0.0554 -0.0772 0.0756 IN
22 0.1214 0.0892 0.4276 IN
32 0.1413 -0.1136 0.2630 IN
13 0.0336 -0.0252 0.0420 IN
23 -0.0073 -0.0266 0.1429 IN
33 0.8849 0.8027 0.9525 IN
var( ~Y ) 0.1584 0.0613 0.2514 IN
var() 0.0238 0.0119 0.0320 IN
var(R) 0.0183 0.0100 0.0408 IN
Wald (Dynamics) 90.0%
Wald (Volatility) 24.2%
Overall Wald 79.8%
Table 10: Test Results of Standard Model with reestimated Parameters
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Auxiliary model Actual 95% Lower 95% Upper IN/OUT
11 0.9145 0.7101 0.9284 IN
21 0.0205 -0.3284 0.1303 IN
31 -0.2214 -0.2800 0.2834 IN
12 0.0554 -0.0831 0.0904 IN
22 0.1214 -0.0840 0.2903 IN
32 0.1413 -0.0190 0.4259 IN
13 0.0336 -0.0276 0.0384 IN
23 -0.0073 -0.0812 0.0566 IN
33 0.8849 0.8354 0.9724 IN
var( ~Y ) 0.1584 0.0628 0.2317 IN
var() 0.0238 0.0177 0.0408 IN
var(R) 0.0183 0.0116 0.0427 IN
Wald (Dynamics) 39.8%
Wald (Volatility) 43.9%
Overall Wald 33.3%
Table 11: Test Results for Credit Model with Reestimated Parameters
Nevertheless it is also clear that the credit model now dominates the standard
model by a substantial margin in dynamics and overall. Table 12 shows the
comparative p-values of the two reestimated models. Overall, the credit model
is roughly three times more probable.
P-values % Credit Model Non-credit Model Ratio
Dynamics 60.2 10.0 6.0
Volatility 56.1 75.8 0.7
Overall 66.7 20.2 3.3
Table 12: Comparison of Credit and Non-credit Model Using Estimated Para-
meters
6 Using the Credit Model to Analyse the Bank-
ing Crisis
6.1 The model in reduced form
We have seen that the credit model brings considerable extra insight into our
analysis of the US data. We now use it to examine the role of nancial shocks
and transmission in the banking crisis period, from 2006Q1 to 2010Q4. We
will do this in two ways: rst, looking at the variance decomposition the model
implies for the period and second, looking at the contribution of the actual
estimated shocks to the real-time evolution of the economy. We begin with the
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reduced form shocks, whose interpretation is as the residuals of the reduced
form equations of the model- that is, they are the overall e¤ect of these errors
on the basic New Keynesian equations extended by the credit equation. These,
as we have seen, are according to the structural model, linear combinations of
the underlying structural shocks. We will examine these structural shocks in
the next subsection. But the reduced form shocks are of interest in themselves
because they extend the usual New Keynesian analysis.
The following charts show the shocks that are backed out of the model and
the data, rst for the whole sample period (Figure 6) and secondly for the crisis
period part in clearer detail (Figure 7).
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Figure 6: Shocks for the Whole Sample
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Figure 7: Shocks for the Crisis Period
It can be seen that the nancial shock forces up the premium savagely in
the third quarter of 2008 (with the Lehman collapse in September) and does
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not fade until late in 2009, under the impact of the large-scale bail-out of the
banking system and the start of Quantitative Easing. Accompanying it in the
next quarter (2008Q4) are a sharp demand contraction, as business condence
fell with the freezing of credit conditions; a supply contraction (reecting a fall
in productivity as output fell faster than employment could be cut); and a strong
positive policy shock, reecting the Feds inability to cut rates below the zero
bound. Of all these shocks the thing to note is the large scale of the nancial
shock- 0.06 at its peak, or 6% per quarter. Not surprisingly we will nd that
this exerts a massive impact on the economy according to the model.
6.1.1 A Stochastic Variance Decomposition of the Crisis Period
Table 13 shows the variance decomposition for each variable in the credit model
during the crisis period. It can be seen that the nancial shock plays an impor-
tant part in explaining the variance of the output gap, though a minor part for
ination and interest rates.
Variances ~Y  R
Demand Shock 5.1% 21.2% 86.4%
Supply Shock 19.6% 3.3% 5.2%
Financial Shock 69.8% 2.6% 4.3%
Policy Shock 5.5% 72.9% 4.1%
Table 13: Variance Decomposition: 2006Q1-2010Q4
This shows how each shock individually contributes to each variables vari-
ance, assuming that they are independent. However, in the case of the crisis the
shocks high correlations mean that we cannot allocate overall shares without
assumptions to identify the causal ordering. As we have seen and discuss further
below, the demand, supply and credit shocks are all combinations of the same
two underlying structural shocks and therefore they cannot be causally ordered.
As for the policy shock it in principle reects the policymakers judgement of
how the Taylor Rule needs to be supplemented in each period; this judgement is
also likely to be responding, in some unknown way reecting the policymakers
varying judgements, to the underlying structural shocks of the model. Thus
again it cannot be ordered causally.
It follows that our assessment of the importance of nancial shocks in re-
peated stochastic simulation can only be done conditional on the assumption
of independence. This conditionality makes it ultimately not very informative,
in the obvious sense that the nancial shocks themselves may really be depen-
dent on the non-nancial underlying shock. We will revisit this issue when we
consider the structural shocks below.
What we can do unambiguously is determine the decomposition of actual
events in the episode in terms of these four shocks as they actually occurred.
Here we can ignore all correlations because we know exactly the shocks values
in each quarter and so events simply are the adding up of these shocks e¤ects.
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We turn to this time-line exercise next.
6.1.2 Accounting for the Shocks in the Crisis Episode
We now turn to how the actual shocks we estimate to have occurred shaped the
actual events of the crisis period. For the output gap, Figure 8, we see that
the credit channel has a small but distinct e¤ect; and that the nancial shocks
have a large e¤ect- also shown here in green. After the nancial shock, the main
e¤ect comes from the supply shock in red.
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Figure 8: Shock Decomposition for Output during Crisis Period
When we turn to ination, Figure 9, we nd that the nancial shock had
little e¤ect. The main e¤ects are coming from the demand and the policy shocks,
with almost all the rest coming from the supply shock (including movements in
commodity prices). Notice that in so far as the nancial shock a¤ects ination
it raises it in 2008.4-2009.3, because in the model it acts as a cost push factor.
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Figure 9: Shock Decomposition for Ination during Crisis Period
For interest rates, Figure 10, the shock decomposition tells a story in which
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the demand shocks e¤ect on output pulls rates down from 2009.1 very sharply,
but this e¤ect is counteracted by the upward push to ination imparted by the
nancial and supply shocks, which cause interest rates to rise. The fact that
the nancial shock raises interest rates seems puzzling until one notes that in
this model higher nancing charges act to raise production costs.
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Figure 10: Shock Decomposition for Interest Rate during Crisis Period
6.2 Understanding the economy in terms of the models
structural shocks
As noted above, this model species two underlying or structural shocks: to
technology (at) and to bank costs (t). In this subsection we extract the implied
structural shocks from the observed reduced from shocks found in our estimation
procedure; we then repeat the exercise we have just carried out, but this time
with these implied structural shocks.
Using our shock notation and assuming that these underlying shocks are like
our estimated reduced form shocks AR(1) (so that for example Etat+1 = aat
where a is the AR coe¢cient of at), then we can write the three reduced form
shocks in terms of these underlying shocks. The coe¢cients are in several cases
determined by the models structural coe¢cients.
1t =
e
c
1  ' e
c
Et(2t+1   2t) + 1Et(t+1   t) (11)
=
  e
c
1  ' e
c
(1  2)2t   1(1  )t (12)
2t =  
 1 1 + '
 1 + '
Et(at+1   at) + 2t + st (13)
=  1
1 + '
 1 + '
(1  a)at + 2t + st (14)
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We now search for the time-series processes at = aat 1 + "at and t =
t 1+ "t that give the best t to our observed shocks. Given the structural
parameters we have estimated the search is heavily constrained. Thus since we
know the demand and supply error and the coe¢cient
 
e
c
1 ' e
c
(1 2);we can nd
1(1   )t directly from the demand error equation and from that estimate
, thus obtaining 1t`; we normalise 1 = 1 so obtaining our estimate of the
monitoring shock t. Now we minimise the sum of squared errors, st and ct,
of the other two error equations, (subject to the known coe¢cient constraints)
with respect to the unknowns, at; 2; a; to nd the minimum we use the sim-
ulated annealing algorithm to search across the parameter space (see appendix
for more details). Figure 11 shows the structural shocks and shock parameters
that achieve this minimisation, as well as the two estimation errors; Table shows
the estimated error coe¢cients. What we see is that the underlying productiv-
ity and monitoring shocks are very highly correlated; and also that the two
extra (estimation) shocks, needed to track the reduced form errors exactly, are
inversely and also highly correlated. Thus in e¤ect where we had three reduced
form shocks, we now have four underlying shocks, productivity and the (extra)
supply shock, monitoring and the (extra) credit shock.
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Figure 11: Structural Shocks
We can think of this credit shock as a measure of how well the structural
model is specifying the overall credit shock, since it reects what is not in the
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Parameters Estimates
e
c
0.6053
' 0.5260
 1.1092
1 1
2 0.000
a 0.8776
 0.8558
Table 14: Estimates of Shock Errors
structural model. Another point to note is that the credit shock only a¤ects the
credit premium shock, whereas the monitoring shock only a¤ects the demand
shock, having a negligible e¤ect on both supply and credit premium shocks in the
constrained estimates ( b2 = 04). The supply shock is quite small, suggesting the
structural model is specifying the supply shocks more accurately; if we ignored
it, we could think of the structural model as requiring one extra shock, the
credit shock, to account exactly for the models errors. It is clear that this
would always be needed since otherwise there would only be three errors for a
four-variable model, implying stochastic singularity. Here we add the supply
shock as a further shock to achieve the best t.
Turning to the IRFs with these structural shocks, we can see in Figure12
that a shock rise in productivity (at) raises output and lowers ination and
interest rates, but raises real interest rates and so lowers the credit premium.
A rise in the extra supply shock (which only enters the Phillips Curve) lowers
ination and so interest rates, and also lowers real interest rates which raises
output and the credit premium. A shock rise in the monitoring cost (t) only
has an e¤ect on demand; it lowers demand initially, and this lowers interest
rates and ination, also real interest rates. These in turn create a subsequent
upturn in output which raises the credit premium. A rise in the extra credit
shock also raises the credit premium (directly) and this feeds into ination; this
in turn pushes up interest rates, both nominal and real output falls.
4The reason for this apparently strange result is that by the model constraint 2 must
be negative (implying that a rise in monitoring costs raises ination and also credit costs).
However the monitoring cost error is found to be highly and positively correlated with pro-
ductivity which is in turn positively correlated with the supply error. So a negative coe¢cient
on the monitoring error in the supply error equation worsens its t. As for the credit error,
this is negatively correlated with the supply error and so also with the monitoring error; so a
positive 2 worsens this equation t also. Thus the estimation forces this coe¢cient to zero.
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Figure 12: IRF to the Structural Shocks
A monetary policy shock (ut) in Figure 13 raises the real interest rate
sharply: this in turn depresses output and ination, and lowers the credit pre-
mium as lending drops with the lower wage bill. Though the real rate rises, the
nominal risk-free rate falls with the fall in ination.
5 10 15 20
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x  10- 4 Y
5 10 15 20
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x  10- 3 π
5 10 15 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
x  10- 4 R
5 10 15 20
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x  10- 4 Δ
Figure 13: IRF to a Policy
Shock
When we redo the variance decomposition of the crisis episode using these
structural shocks and assuming that they are independent we nd quite a similar
share for nancial shocks on the output gap, but much larger for interest rates
and ination. Again it would be impossible to allocate the share reliably if we
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regarded the shocks are highly correlated, in line with their sample behaviour
seen from the charts above. However according to the structural model they
are in truth independent and simply show correlation in this sample by chance.
In this case the Table 15 shows the true decomposition, with nancial shocks
contributing 62% of output, 32% of ination, and 89% of interest rate variance.
Variances Decomposition ~Y  R
Productivity Shock 36.9% 1.6% 2.9%
Monitoring Shock 0.3% 26.0% 81.3%
Extra Supply Shock 0.6% 4.0% 5.5%
Extra Credit Shock 62.0% 6.0% 7.5%
Policy Shock 0.3% 62.3% 2.7%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Financial Shocks 62.3% 32.0% 88.8%
Non-Financial Shocks 37.7% 68.0% 11.2%
Table 15: Variance Decomposition: 2006Q1-2010Q4
This nding from the structural model ts well into the existing literature.
We can say that typical crisis nancial factors are an important source of output
gap and interest rate variance but less important for ination. What we have
found here for output variance is similar to ndings of other recent work using
stationarised data, where it has been found that nancial shocks were dominant
in the crisis period- Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Gilchrist et al. (2009), and
Christiano et al. (2010). This is in contrast to the ndings of Le, Meenagh
and Minford (2012) who use raw, non-stationary data; with this they nd that
the productivity shock is non-stationary, while some other non-nancial shocks
are highly persistent, and these shocks dominate the crisis. They report that
moving from stationary to nonstationary data reduces the share of nancial
shocks in output volatility sharply, from 52.3% to 8.5%. This is also in line with
the ndings of Stock and Walson (2012) using a dynamic factor VAR; they nd
that the contribution of nancial shocks to the crisis period is not signicantly
di¤erent from its contribution in previous periods. Thus our nding here, like
those of other recent authors using stationary data, that it is nancial shocks
dominating output variance, most likely reects our abstraction from the shocks
contributing to the trends in the data.
If we turn to the time-lines generated by the structural shocks, we see that
the output gap (Figure 14) is dominated by the credit shock and the produc-
tivity shock which pull in opposite directions.The other shocks have small or
imperceptible e¤ects; as we have seen the monitoring shock only works through
the demand error. If we compare this with the timeline in terms of the re-
duced form shocks where both supply and nancial shocks worked in the same
direction, we can see that the model is saying (if we allow the credit shock to
supplement it) that nancial shocks were dominant in reducing output a) by
raising the credit premium b) by raising nancial costs more than an opposite
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rise in productivity lowered production costs (the negative supply shock).
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Figure 14: Shock Decomposition for Output during
Crisis Period
Turning to the ination time-line (Figure 15) we see that the dominant shock
is monetary but that all the other shocks contribute to some degree, in line
with our variance decomposition. In 2008Q4, when Lehman failed, the quarter
of greatest volatility, monetary policy was tightened compared with the Taylor
Rule due to the zero lower bound; this is partially o¤set here by a cost-raising
credit shock.
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Figure 15: Shock Decomposition for Ination during
Crisis Period
If we turn to the interest rate time-line (Figure 16) we nd the monitoring
shock playing an overwhelming role, as in our stochastic decomposition above
(Table 15). Otherwise small e¤ects come from the credit and supply shocks.
The monetary policy shock hardly enters, being absorbed almost entirely in its
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ination e¤ect; nor does the productivity shock, which in its turn is absorbed
mainly by its output e¤ect.
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Figure 16: Shock Decomposition for Interest Rate
during Crisis Period
The examination of the structural model thus yields some additional infor-
mation about the sources of volatility in this crisis episode, provided we allow
the model to be supplemented with additional credit and supply shocks, whose
interpretation is that, unlike the productivity and monitoring shocks, they each
contribute solely to the credit premium and supply equations respectively. Nev-
ertheless, this necessity to add, at least, one very large (credit) shock inevitably
casts doubt on the models structural interpretation of the reduced form shocks.
If we believe a monitoring shock to be the driver of credit costs, what then
exactly is the credit shock? Or vice versa, if the credit shock is driving the
credit premium alone, what exactly is the monitoring cost? Thus in the end
the reduced form shocks remain the limit of our hard empirical knowledge, while
the structural model can be regarded as a useful means to construct a viable
4-equation aggregate model with credit as well as a source of suggestions for the
interpretation of the underlying shocks.
7 Conclusion
We have compared the ability of the standard New Keynesian model and a
version augmented with a credit channel to account for the behaviour of the
US data over a sample period extending from the start of the 1980s up to and
including the recent crisis period to the end of 2010. We found that both models
could match this behaviour reasonably well even in their calibrated form; and
once reestimated could do so quite easily. Of the two the credit-augmented
version came much the closer to the data. When accordingly we used this credit
model to account for the crisis period, we found that nancial shocks played a
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dominant role in the banking crisis, accounting for some two thirds of output
gap variation, whether we use the reduced from or the structural shocks. This
is much in line with other work on the banking crisis that examines the business
cycle variation over the crisis; these studies, like ours here, abstract from the
trend movements in output and other variables which some other recent work
has found to contribute the dominant source of output variation in the crisis.
Clearly much work remains to be done on exactly what caused these, here
exogenous, nancial shocks. Nevertheless, the fact that such shocks can occur
and that they can contribute to recessions should not be a surprise; nor is there
necessarily any means to suppress such shocks, as seems to be the intention of
such legislation as Dodd-Frank. The model here at least helps to establish the
quantitative role of these shocks in the economys behaviour during the crisis.
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8 Appendix
In order to estimate the parameters in Equation 11 to 15, we assume at =
aat 1 + "at and t = t 1 + "t. The shock equations can be written as
follows:
1t = 11(1  2)2t   1(1  )t (17)
2t = 21(1  a)at + 2t (18)
3t = 31(1  a)at + 32at   2t (19)
where 11 =  
e
c
1 ' e
c
; 21 = 
 1 1+'
 1+' ; 31 =
 2 e
c
(1+')
 1+' ;and 32 =
(1+ 1 e
c
)(1+')
 1+' .
When we estimate the above, these parameters (11; 21; 31; 32) are restricted
to the values calculated by the estimated parameters in Table 9. We normalised
the shock t by setting 1 equal to one. 2 is a function of microfounded pa-
rameters that need to be estimated using Simulated Annealing approach with
initial values of the calibrated ones (the model theory makes it negative). We
estimate 2 using the following steps:
Step 1: Starting from Equation 17, estimate 2t in an AR(1) process to obtain
2 . Given 11; 2 and data 2t, extract 1(1  )t and estimate 1(1  )t
in an AR(1) process to get . Then we can solve for t. The model actually
tells us exactly what t is. So there is no error on this equation.
Step 2: Plug t into Equation 18 and 19. Iterate using Simulated Annealing
procedure. Starting from the initial value of 2, generate from Equation 18 the
data a1t = 21(1   a)at; then generate from 19 a value for a2t = [31(1  
a) + 32]at. Calculate the AR(1) coe¢cients on each of these two expressions
in a1t and a2t and use the average as . Knowing 21, 31, 32 and with this
estimate of a, create at = 0:5(a1t + a2t): This gives equal weight to the two
equations in estimating at and a.
Step 3: This creates two errors (st and ct) in the Equation 18 and 19. Now
choose 2 by Simulated Annealing to minimise sum of squared two errors (again
giving equal weight to the two equations), iterating over Steps 2 and 3 until the
minimum is reached.
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